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ABSTRACT 
The bailout of the American Auto Industry is considered the largest government 
intervention in industrial America since the Second World War. Almost 80 billion 
dollars were injected in an industry that in 2007 represented 1 million 
manufacturing jobs, and 3.7% of the American GDP. This work project intends to 
study the impact of such an occurrence in other economic Sectors of the American 
Economy, by looking at how the Share Price Returns of the major American firms 
react to the Auto Bailout Events. Some Sectors seem more tightly connected to the 
Auto Industry than others. The perception of the Bailout Events is also different 
according to the Sector and to the spectrum of time considered. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Charles Erwin Wilson was the President of General Motors, leading the company since 
1941 and all through World War II, when President Eisenhower nominated him as 
Secretary of Defense in January of 1953. After his nomination, and before a Senate 
Committee, when asked if he could make a decision as Secretary of Defense that would 
be adverse to the interests of General Motors, Wilson replied by saying “what is good 
for General Motors is good to the United States of America and vice-versa”.
1 General 
Motors, at the time was, and still is, the leading firm of the American Auto Industry. 
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This statement, misfit or not, together with the fact that an outstanding political figure 
was coming from the leadership of one of the three big American automakers, shows 
the historical importance of the Auto Industry, born in the beginning of the twentieth 
century, both to the United States Economy and to United States Politics. 
The history of the Big-Three American automakers - General Motors, Ford, and 
Chrysler - all based in the city of Detroit, in Michigan, is tightly connected with the 
success of the American Economy in the post-war period. The Big-Three, as they are 
usually called, represented more than seventy percent of the market share of all the 
autos sold in the US up until the 1970s
2
. Nevertheless, their story is not only filled with 
success. Since the mid-twentieth century, the American Auto Industry faced two 
especially difficult periods. 
The first was in the 1970s when fuel prices soared due to the Arab oil embargo in 1973, 
and due to the Iranian revolution in 1979. Furthermore, the American automakers faced 
growing Japanese competition simultaneously. The second period of difficulty is the 
one that will be studied, and was in the recent slump that brought the World Economy 
into recession in 2008 and 2009. By 2008, the Detroit automakers were already in a 
fragile situation. After 20 years of relatively good results, the American manufacturers 
were not capable of adjusting to the oil price increases that took place between 2003 and 
2007, keeping their manufacturing based on Sport Utility Vehicles and pickup trucks, 
which were the opposite of what the market was demanding: fuel efficient vehicles. The 
credit crunch and the economic slowdown of 2008 placed pressure on prices of raw 
materials, and led to a huge drop in vehicle demand. By the end of 2008, the Big Three 
automakers asked for a government bailout in order to avoid bankruptcy.  
                                                          
2
 Klier and Rubenstein (2012). 
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The need for a Bailout for the Big-Three American automakers is, even today, in 
question. Obama’s Administration in 2009 stated that the failure of the American auto 
industry would have been a catastrophe, with huge impacts in other Sectors of the 
American Economy. The ripple effect on parts and material suppliers – steel, rubber, 
glass and the fabricating trades – would have cost a million jobs and resulted in huge 
losses in tax revenues. The crash of the Big-Three automakers would be felt throughout 
the economy, from factories to dealerships to local governments and to schools. 
Nevertheless, it was the Bush Administration that prompted the Bailout of the American 
automakers at the end of its tenure. On December 19
th
, 2008 the White House fact sheet 
that accompanied the announcement of a 17.4 billion dollars
3
 government assistance to 
the Auto Industry stated that “the direct costs of American automakers failing and 
laying off their workers in the near term would result in a more than 1 percent reduction 
in real GDP growth and about 1.1 million workers losing their jobs, including workers 
for automotive suppliers and dealers”.
4
 
Given the relevance of the Auto Industry to the American Economy, which justified the 
political argument for an industry that is “Too Big to Fail”, it is important to measure 
the consequences of Auto Industry Bailout to other Sectors of the American Economy. 
Which Sectors were more tightly connected to the American Auto Industry? This work 
project intends to answer that question by performing an Event Study. I studied the 10 
main Sectors of the American Economy, according to the Global Industry 
Classification.  Each Sector is composed by firms that are present in the S&P500, the 
index that puts together the 500 biggest American firms in terms of capitalization. The 
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Cumulative Abnormal Returns of all firms present in the S&P500 are analyzed around 5 
major Events related to the Auto Industry Bailout. All the 5 Events were important daily 
occurrences of the Bailout process. Cumulative Abnormal Returns are the sum of 
Abnormal Share Price Returns. Abnormal Returns reflect the excess Share Price Return 
of a certain firm in relation to the market return. In this case, given that all firms belong 
to the same index, the S&P500 return is considered as market return. 3 different 
windows of Cumulative Abnormal Returns are computed. All start in 1 day before each 
event, and go to 1, 3, and 7 days after the same event. 
Several Sectors appear to respond significantly to the Auto Bailout Events. Consumer 
Discretionary, Energy, Financials, Industrials, and Materials, are the Sectors that 
generally are significantly influenced by the Bailout to the Auto Industry. That response 
is also stronger in the shorter window [-1,1], which may mean that there is some kind of 
overreaction that vanishes as time passes by, at least for some Sectors such as the 
Energy, Materials, and Health Care. On the contrary, Consumer Discretionary, 
Industrials, and Information Technology, seemed to react more to the Auto Bailout 
Events when the windows are larger, as is in the case of the [-1,7] window. For the 
Energy and Materials Sectors, the Auto Events seemed to have a negative impact at the 
beginning, when I look to the smallest window, [-1,1], but then the impact turns out to 
be positive in the largest window [-1;7]. For instance, in the Energy Sector, Event 2 has 
a negative significant impact on Cumulative Abnormal Returns of 11.3% in the smallest 
window, but has a positive significant effect of 3.3% in largest window [-1;7]. A similar 
thing happens with the Materials Sector in 4 out of 5 Bailout Events. Event 2 has a 
negative impact of 3% on the shorter window of the Materials Sector. The same Event 
has a positive impact of 6% when the largest window is considered. Both values are 
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significant. This may indicate that these industries, and their stakeholders, after some 
days, perceive the Bailout Events as a solution to the problem of the Auto Industry and 
a favorable thing to the American Economy. 
This work is organized in four additional parts. Part 2 reviews the existing literature on 
the relation between Financial Markets and important economic news, on the Bailout to 
the American Auto Industry in 2008 and 2009, and on the empirical methods of an 
Event Study. Part 3 presents the dataset that is used, and the empirical strategy that was 
conducted. Part 4 shows the results. Part 5 concludes. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There are several studies that try to measure the impact of economic policies and 
political events on financial markets. The main idea and the structure of my work came 
from two different sources: Sazedj and Tavares (2011) have analyzed, through a type 
of Event Study, the consequences of President Barack Obama’s speeches and press 
conferences on the three main American stock returns indices (Dow Jones, S&P500, 
and NASDAQ), and the influence of its words in the behavior of economic agents. 
Fisman (2001), in his classical paper, looked at the effect of rumors over former 
Indonesian President Suharto that ruled Indonesia from 1967 to 1998. Fisman’s prior 
conclusion was that due to Suharto’s strong political influence and power, adverse 
events triggered by rumors over his health could lead to changes in the value of more 
politically connected firms, particularly in his final years in office. Looking at 
companies traded on the Jakarta Stock Exchange, Fisman performs an Event Study in 
which he clearly concludes that share price returns of politically connected firms were 
lower than the returns of less connected firms on the day of the events. 
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To understand the idiosyncrasies of the American Auto Industry, and the relation of the 
Detroit automakers with the American Economy, several investigations that have been 
made about the restless period of 2008 and 2009 for the Big-Three American auto 
makers were considered. Klier and Rubenstein, have done several works on the 
importance of the Auto Industry to the American Economy, and about the on goings of 
the Government Bailout to the Big-Three Detroit automakers. In 2012, they studied why 
American automakers were already in a fragile situation when they faced the 2008 
financial turmoil, and why the Auto Industry still is essential to the industrial production 
of the American Economy, and to the American political arena. Furthermore, they look 
at the amounts involved in the bailout, and how rescued automakers fulfilled the 
conditions underlined in the bailout.  
Two thematic books about the American Auto Industry were also important to 
understand its evolution until the Bailout. One of them, by Paul Ingrassia (2010) 
makes a good overview over the American auto industry history, particularly of the Big-
Three US automakers (General, Motors, and Chrysler), from their appearance in the 
beginning of the twentieth century until today. He explains the reasons that led to 
several moments of financial difficulty in the American Auto business throughout 
almost a century of history. Finally, he describes the course of the Bailout Events in 
2008 and 2009. The other book, written by Steven Rattner (2010), outlines his 
personal experience while he served as the head advisor to Barack Obama on the Task 
Force to the Auto Industry in 2009. He provides a clear insight into the different 
interests of the stakeholders in the Auto Industry, and on how difficult it was to 
negotiate the underlying conditions necessary for the bailout. Cole et all (2008) studied 
the presumed impact on the American Economy of a steep decline of Detroit Three 
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automakers, by assessing the impact on the American Economy of a putative 
contraction in car production, that would result from a non-bailout from the US 
government. The authors conclude that a contraction in the production of the American 
automakers would lead to significant losses in the overall American Economy, 
particularly in terms of tax receipts and average personal income. 
Cooney et all (2009) looks at the Crisis of the Detroit Big-Three by following the 
restructuring plans done by General Motors and Chrysler after the bailout. Specifically, 
they focus on the debt targets and unit labor costs that should mandatorily shrink under 
the conditions of government assistance. They also try to assess the possible spillover 
effects on the American Economy of an Auto bankruptcy situation. 
3. METHODOLOGY 
Database description 
The Share Price Returns were obtained through the Wharton Research Data Services, a 
web-based data service that provides financial and business information to the academic 
and research community. Daily Share Price Returns from September 12
th
, 2007 to 
September 11
th
, 2009 of all firms present in S&P500 are taken. The period studied will 
be from September 2008 onwards, where the majority of the Auto Industry occurrences 
took place. Share Price Returns before September 2008 will serve to compute previous 
calculations, which will be explained further in this work. Selected firms are all present 
in the S&P 500, an index that compounds the 500 largest American companies in terms 
of market capitalization, that have stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange or 
NASDAQ. Evaluating the changes in value of the largest American firms in terms of 
market capitalization seems to be a good proxy of firm behavior, particularly firms from 
different Sectors of the American Economy.   
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The firms were, then, divided by Sectors. It is not easy to split firms into different 
industries since it is not always clear if two firms are competing in the exactly same 
market. There are several classifications for economic Sectors. A division according to 
the Global Industry Classification Standard (GIC), the classification that is widely used 
in investment research and by asset management professionals worldwide, was selected. 
GIC divides the S&P500 firms in 10 different Sectors: 1. Consumer Discretionary, 2. 
Telecommunication Services, 3. Consumer Staples, 4. Energy, 5. Financials Materials, 
6. Health Care, 7. Industrials, 8 .Information Technology, 9. Materials, 10. Utilities. 
Then, one more crucial Sector is added to these 10: the Auto Industry. This group will 
be composed only by General Motors and Ford, both also present in the S&P500. Share 
Price Returns of Chrysler are not included, given that Chrysler has not been traded 
publicly since 1998, when it merged with Germany’s Daimler-Benz. For a more 
detailed look to the firms that are present in each Sector refer to Appendix D at the end 
of this work project. For further description of the Sector Division that was chosen refer 
to Appendix C. 
Estimation Strategy 
An Event Study is used as an empirical strategy to identify which Sectors of the 
American Economy are linked to the Auto Industry. The Event Study Methodology was 
introduced by Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969), and has become the standard 
method of measuring security price reaction to some announcement or event. The Event 
Study has two main purposes: to test for the existence of an information effect, and to 
identify factors that explain changes in firms value on the event date. It assumes 
inherently that the market, in some degree, processes the information in an efficient and 
unbiased manner.  
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According to the episodes described in the book Crash Course: The automobile 
industry road to bankruptcy and bailout by Paul Ingrassia, and to the main Auto Bailout 
news reported by the press, 5 important daily Events, that were major occurrences in the 







November 2008): The 3 CEOs of the main three American automakers go 
to Washington to request approximately $25 billion dollars of government aid to 
support their operations and to keep their companies afloat. It was the first official 
confirmation that American auto makers were in big trouble. All three CEOs travelled 
from Detroit to Washington in their private jets, provoking a giant public flurry. 
2
nd
 Event (4 December 2008): The 3 CEOs go back to Washington to testify before 
Congress to make a stronger case about why they need government help to keep the 




 Event (19 December 2008): Speaking from the White House, President Bush says 
that the American government will grant loans to the Big-Three Detroit based firms to 
avoid an industry collapse and due to the Auto Industry importance to the American 
Economy. It was the first sign that the American Government was available to provide 
money to the automakers.  It was also the biggest industrial bailout in American history. 
4
th
 Event (30 March 2009): President Barack Obama addresses the nation to say that 
working capital will be provided to General Motors in the next 60 days, under tough 
restructuring conditions. The President also states that Chrysler will receive more 
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exact occurrence dates of some of them differ according to the source. The dates of the 5 Events that 
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 Event (1 June 2009): – Government loans proved fruitless and General Motors 
officially files for bankruptcy. It was the 4
th
 largest bankruptcy in history. General 
Motors was set to close a dozen plants and to cut more than 20000 jobs.  
Hence, my Event Study attempts to analyze how the different Sectors of the American 
Economy reacted to such events. In order to measure each Sector’s reaction, the 
variation of the Share Prices of the firms present in each Sector is studied. My 
dependent variable is Cumulative Abnormal Returns that are obtained through the 
previous calculation of all firms Daily Abnormal Returns. Daily Abnormal Returns tell 
us how different the return of a given firm is in relation to the market return. As all our 
firms belong to the S&P500, Share Price Returns of the overall S&P500 index are used 
to compute Daily Abnormal Returns. Computation of Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
follows. The idea behind considering Cumulative Abnormal Returns is that it makes it 
easier to make overall inferences regarding the reaction to the event of interest, and to 
account for the fact that investors and stakeholders may not become aware of a certain 
Event immediately. Cumulative Abnormal Returns pretend, therefore, to account for 
some expectable lag in information assimilation and to correct for excessive over or 
under reactions. I will consider 3 different windows of Cumulative Abnormal Returns: 
[-1;1], [-1,3], [-1,7]. From 1 day before each Event, to capture market volatility right 
before the event, to 3, 5, and 7 days, respectively, after the same Event. 
Firstly, Daily Abnormal Returns are computed in the following way:  
(1)                                                         
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where Return is the Share Price Return of firm i on a given day, Market Return is the 
Daily Returns of the S&P500. β is the Market Return coefficient that is different for the 
11 Sectors that are considered; it represents the different impacts that the Market Return 
has in each different Sector. β is calculated through the time period between September 
12
th
, 2007 to September 11
th
, 2008, while the daily abnormal returns that will be used to 
compute our results are calculated from September 12
th
, 2008 to September 11
th
, 2009. 
The β of each Sector is calculated outside this time period to avoid possible bias in our 
results. 
The three different windows of Cumulated Abnormal Returns are computed as follows: 
(2)     
      
                                                           
(3)      
      
     
      
                                           
(4)     
      
     
      
                                           
The intention now is to verify how Cumulated Abnormal Returns respond to the five-
selected Auto Industry Bailout related Events, in all of the 11 different Sectors that were 
chosen. 
To measure the impact of each Event on firm’s Cumulative Abnormal Returns in a time 
period from September 12
th
, 2008 to September 11
th
, 2009 (252 working days), the 
following regression was run: 
(5)                                                     
x = Auto, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 
where      are the Cumulative Abnormal Returns of a given firm present in the 
S&P500 between September 12
th
, 2008 and September 11
th
, 2009, and the coefficient   
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measures the impact of the Auto Events on the Cumulative Abnormal Returns of firm i. 
j goes from 1 to 5, and corresponds to the 5 selected Auto Events. The regression is then 
conditioned to the Sector to which firm i belongs in order to look to the impact of the 5 
Events according to the 11 different Sectors. (x = Auto Industry; 1. Consumer 
Discretionary; 2. Telecommunications; 3. Consumer Staples; 4. Energy; 5. Financials; 




Basically, by restringing the sample of all firms to only the ones belonging to a specific 
Sector, an assessment of how the Cumulative Abnormal Returns of a certain Sector 
react to the selected Auto Bailout Events can be done.  
As previously stated, the 5 days of Auto Events are: 19 Nov 2008, 04 Dec 2008, 19, 
Dec 2008, 30 Mar 2009, and 01 Jun 2009, respectively.  
4. RESULTS 
Description 
In this section the estimated results are presented. In tables 1, 2, and 3, Ordinary Least 
Square regressions can be found, with robust standard errors of the previous defined 
three windows of Cumulative Abnormal Returns: [-1,1], [-1,3], [-1,7]. These three 
windows have the purpose of giving us different spectrums of time. The first tries to 
look at the short-run reaction to the Auto Events. The last looks to the reaction of 
investors based in a more thoughtful reasoning in processing information. The impact of 
each Event on the 10 different Sectors plus the Auto Industry is shown. Together with 
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 For completeness of the results, an additional regression can be found in Appendix B. The relation 
between events and sectors is found to be quite similar to the one presented in the main regression. 
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the linear combination of all the Events, this is the total impact of all 5 of the Events on 
the Cumulative Abnormal Returns of a certain Sector. 
For the Auto Industry, all of the significant values have a negative sign for every single 
window. This means that the Events that were selected are perceived as being bad to the 
business of automakers. Event 3, for example, when Bush makes his statement about 
the need for an Auto Bailout, has a significant negative impact on the Auto Industry in 
all windows of Cumulative Abnormal Returns. In the first window, that sums the 
Abnormal Returns in the 3 days around the Auto Events, Event 3 pushes Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns of the Auto Industry down around 14%.  Therefore, looking at all the 
3-day Cumulative Abnormal Returns of the Auto firms during the year, Event 3 on 
December 4
th
, 2008, decreases the Cumulative Abnormal Returns, on average, by 14%. 
In the second window, that considers 5-days around the Event, Event 3 has, on average, 
a negative effect of 27,9% on Cumulative Abnormal Returns of the Auto Industry in 
that day. In the last window that goes from the day before the Event to 7 days after the 
same Event, Event 3 has a negative impact of 31,2% on the Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns of the Auto Industry. All of these values are significant. Share Prices of Auto 
firms (General Motors and Ford) were truly slashed in this period.
7
 
It is interesting to note that some Bailout Events seem to have no significant impact on 
the Auto Industry itself. This may be explained by some anticipation of the 
announcements from the stakeholders of the automakers business, that may had have 
faster access to important information in relation to other economics agents. 
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Table 1, the first window of Cumulative Abnormal Returns, is where more significant 
values were found. There are 34 times in which Events have a significant impact on 
economic Sectors considered. Events seem to have a particularly negative significant 
impact on Sectors 4 and 9, Energy and Materials, respectively. 
Table 1 - Impact of Auto Industry Events on the CAR of different Economic Sectors 















0.0461 -0.0037 -0.0790*** 0.0043 -0.120*** -0.0258** -0.0605*** 0.0114 0.0016 -0.0468*** -0.0204** 
(-0.0405) (-0.0099) (-0.0258) (-0.0089) (-0.0130) (-0.0130) (-0.0105) (-0.0088) (-0.0096) (-0.0142) (-0.0093) 
Event 
2 
-0.135** 0.0540*** 0.0213 0.0163* -0.113*** 0.0839*** 0.0251*** -0.0148** 0.0102 -0.0309** 
-
0.0229*** 
(-0.064) (-0.009) (-0.0337) (-0.0091) (-0.0084) (-0.0158) (-0.0078) (-0.0061) (-0.0078) (-0.0125) (-0.0074) 
Event 
3 
-0.144*** -0.0089 0.0215 0.0222*** -0.0659*** 0.0054 0.0194*** 0.0053 -0.0061 -0.0495*** 0.0239*** 
(-0.0084) (-0.0063) (-0.0138) (-0.0077) (-0.0084) (-0.0058) (-0.0052) (-0.0061) (-0.0065) (-0.0101) (-0.0054) 
Event 
4 
-0.267* -0.0096 0.0151 -0.0032 -0.0593*** 0.0148** 0.0103** -0.0152*** -0.0048 -0.0147** 0.0072 
(-0.161) (-0.0061) (-0.0118) (-0.0042) (-0.0068) (-0.0074) (-0.0049) (-0.0040) (-0.0057) (-0.0071) (-0.0046) 
Event 
5 
-0.300 0.0295*** -0.0091 0.0151*** 0.0245*** -0.0210*** 0.0193*** 0.0262*** -0.0053 0.0269*** 0.0104*** 
(-0.266) (-0.0059) (-0.0074) (-0.0052) (-0.0062) (-0.0061) (-0.0057) (-0.0057) (-0.0036) (-0.0081) (-0.0037) 
    





-0.7995 0.0613*** -0.0303 0.0547** 
(-
0.3328***) 0.0573 0.0136 0.0128 -0.0044 (-0.1150***) -0.0019 
(-0.3204) (-0.0171) (-0.0467) (0.0163) (0.0198) (0.0233) (0.0160) (0.0141) (0.0155) (0.0240) (0.0143) 
                        
Nr. of 
Obs. 504 17,640 1,512 8,568 9,072 21,168 11,340 14,616 15,624 7,560 7,560 
R2 0.0320 0.0050 0.0170 0.0030 0.0400 0.0040 0.0110 0.0030 0.0000 0.0080 0.0050 
 
Note: Robust Standard errors in parentheses. ***Denotes significance at the 1% percent confidence level, ** at the 5 percent 
confidence level, * at the 10 percent level. 
 
 
Other Sectors such as Sector 1 and 3, Consumer Discretionary and Consumer Staples, 
seem to have a positive reaction of their Cumulative Abnormal Returns in response to 
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the Auto Events. Events 2 and 5, with 5 significant coefficients each, seem to be the 
Events with the biggest impact on this short-term window.  
 
Table 2 - Impact of Auto Industry Events on the CAR of different Economic Sectors 















0.0098 0.0155 -0.0387** 0.014 0.0074 0.0223 -0.0475*** 0.0128 0.00136 -0.0068 0.0140* 
(-0.0778) (-0.0103) (-0.0194) (-0.0116) (-0.009) (-0.0141) (-0.0101) (-0.0084) (-0.0106) (-0.0156) (-0.0078) 
Event 
2 
-0.0017 0.0478*** 0.0419 -0.0074 -0.0281*** 0.0782*** 0.013 -0.0045 0.0455*** 0.0284** -0.0359*** 
(-0.0748) (-0.0086) (-0.0419) (-0.0101) (-0.0082) (-0.0188) (-0.008) (-0.0085) (-0.0092) (-0.0131) (-0.0045) 
Event 
3 




(-0.036) (-0.007) (-0.0186) (-0.0089) (-0.0105) (-0.0092) (-0.0054) (-0.0063) (-0.0076) (-0.01) (-0.0067) 
Event 
4 
-0.253 0.0286*** 0.0430*** 0.00823* -0.0202*** 0.00724 -0.00488 0.0167*** 0.0058 0.0160* -0.0005 
(-0.17) (-0.0084) (-0.0164) (-0.005) (-0.0062) (-0.008) (-0.006) (-0.0047) (-0.00577) (-0.0083) (-0.0049) 
Event 
5 
-0.199 0.0127** -0.0218 0.0118** 0.0003 0.0014 0.00133 0.0289*** 0.0033 0.0188** 0.005 
(-0.192) (-0.0062) (-0.0159) (-0.006) (-0.0086) (-0.0062) (-0.007) (-0.0067) (-0.0046) (-0.009) (-0.0038) 
    






0.0969 0.0362 0.0485 (-0.1079***) 0.12*** -0.0173 0.0631*** -0.0442 0.0113 -0.0037 
(-0.2808) (-0.0183) (0.0547) (-0.0193) (-0.0192) (-0.0272) (-0.0168) (-0.0158) (-0.0176) (-0.026) (-0.013) 
                        
Nr. of 
Obs. 
504 17,640 1,512 8,568 9,072 21,168 11,340 14,616 15,624 7,560 7,560 




Note: Robust Standard errors in parentheses. ***Denotes significance at the 1% percent confidence level, ** at the 5 percent 
confidence level, * at the 10 percent level. 
 
In Table 2, 25 significant values are observed. The Auto Industry seems to be hit 
particularly hard when looking at this window, shown by the significance of the linear 
combination of all the five Events on the American Auto Industry. The Energy Sector, 
once again, responds in a quite negative and significant way to almost all of the Events. 
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Looking at the last window of Cumulative Abnormal Returns, in Table 3, Event 3 is the 
one with a more significant impact; it has 7 significant coefficients out of 11. 
 
Table 3 - Impact of Auto Industry Events on the CAR of different Economic Sectors 


















0.449*** 0.0756*** 0.0183 0.0103 -0.0129 0.0303** -0.0452*** 0.0461*** 0.0220** 0.0242 0.0059 
(-0.0095) (-0.0097) (-0.0157) (-0.0136) (-0.0122) (-0.0119) (-0.0124) (-0.0111) (-0.0104) (-0.0173) (-0.0075) 
Event 2 
-0.0425 0.0389*** 0.0006 0.0105 0.0105 0.0477** 0.0177 -0.0122 0.0551*** 0.0609*** 
-
0.0257*** 
(-0.12) (-0.0107) (-0.0354) (-0.0113) (-0.0113) (-0.0224) (-0.0119) (-0.0093) (-0.0119) (-0.0159) (-0.0054) 
Event 3 
-0.312*** -0.0038 0.0215 0.0243*** -0.0122 0.0125 0.0275*** 0.0274*** -0.0140* -0.0251* 0.0370*** 
(-0.0015) (-0.0075) (-0.0138) (-0.0085) (-0.0106) (-0.0102) (-0.007) (-0.0078) (-0.0077) (-0.0135) (-0.0061) 
Event 4 
-0.1220 0.0466*** 0.0356 0.0107* -0.0131 0.0274*** -0.0055 0.0153* 0.0264*** 0.0087 0.0370*** 
-0.3070 (-0.0109) (-0.0219) (-0.0065) (-0.008) (-0.0097) (-0.0082) (-0.0086) (-0.0066) (-0.0111) (-0.0061) 
Event5 
0.171** 0.0170** -0.0266 0.0022 0.0101 -0.0014 -0.0119 0.0391*** 0.0145** 0.0246* 0.0121*** 
(-0.0864) (-0.0071) (-0.0196) (-0.0072) 
(-
0.00997) 
(-0.0087) (-0.0076) (-0.0081) (-0.0069) (-0.0134) (-0.004) 
                        
All 
Events 
0.1441 0.1744*** 0.0494 0.0579* 0.0049 0.1164*** -0.0173 0.1158*** 0.1041*** 0.0933** 0.0329 
0.341 0.0208 0.0505 0.0218 0.0237 0.0303 0.0217 0.1158 0.02 0.0322 0.013 
                        
Nr. of 
Obs. 
504 17,640 1,512 8,568 9,072 21,168 11,340 14,616 15,624 7,560 7,560 
R2 0.022 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 
 
Note: Robust Standard errors in parentheses. ***Denotes significance at the 1% percent confidence level, ** at the 5 percent 
confidence level, * at the 10 percent level. 
 
Sector 1 (Consumer Discretionary), Sector 7 (Industrials), and Sector 8 (Information 
Technology) seem to be the ones that are more affected by the 5 Auto Bailout Events in 
the longest period window. Generally, all these 3 Sectors show significant positive 
responses to the American Auto Bailout Events. 
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What is interesting here is, at odds with the two previous shorter windows, the major 
parts of the significant coefficients are positive. This may mean that the firms of each 
Sector, after at least 3 days, start to perceive the Events related to the Auto Industry as a 
good thing for their own business. On the contrary, when the Events arise, some Sectors 
seem to overreact to our Events about the American Auto Industry Bailout, for example 
the Energy Sector, which compounds companies, engaged in the exploration, 
production, marketing, refining and transportation of oil and gas products, coal and 
other consumable fuels. Given that 70% of all oil consumed in the U.S. is used for 
transportation, it makes sense that the Energy Sector seems to be one of the most 
affected industries by the Auto Industry Events.
8
 
There are several Sectors that seem to decrease the scale of their response to the Auto 
Events as the length of our windows is augmented. It is clear that in the case of Sectors 
4 (Energy), 6 (Health Care), 9 (Materials), as we move to a larger window, less 
significant coefficients for the Auto Events are obtained. This may mean that in the 
beginning the stakeholders in these Sectors start to perceive that there is a problem with 
the Auto Industry that may affect their own Sector, but then, after some days, they see 
these Bailout Events as possible solutions to a problem that already existed. 
Contrarily, other Sectors such as Sector 1 (Consumer Discretionary), Sector 7 
(Industrials), and Sector 8 (Information Technology), seem to become aware of the 
impact of the Auto Bailout Events only after a short period of time. These Sectors, 
looking at the first window, [-1,1],  do not seem to respond significantly to the Event 
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Days. Nevertheless, in the last window, almost all the Event coefficients have a 
significant impact on the Cumulative Abnormal Returns of these 3 Sectors.  
Graphical analysis 
A better idea of these results can be taken by looking to Figure 1. Below the Sector 
reaction to the linear combination of all the Auto Bailout Events is shown. Grid 




          
              

































                         
                           
              
As stated above, here it is clear that taking into consideration the impact of all the Auto 
Bailout Events, there are Sectors that seem to react in a negative way at the beginning, 
perceiving the Bailout as bad for their business, but after some days the reaction is 
positive and the Bailout passes over as a valid solution.  
This behavior is observed mainly in the Auto Industry, Energy Sector, and Materials 
Sector. Sectors such as Financials and Industrials have a positive reaction in terms of 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns in all of the 3 studied windows. That tells us that since 
the beginning of the Auto Bailout Events, stakeholders of Financials and Industrials 







































Besides the Health Sector, all Sectors show a positive response to the 5 Auto Bailout 
Events in the longest window, [-1,7]. The Sectors’ stakeholders seem, after some over 
reaction to new information, to interpret the Government Bailout of the Auto Industry 
as a favorable occurrence.  
Furthermore, in Figure 2, it can be seen that all of these Sectors seem to move together 
along the days around the Event. Underneath a graphic observation of Market responses 
of the Auto Industry is depicted, and the Sectors that were seen above as more 
connected with the Auto Industry. As such, this time, to get a more immediate reaction, 
instead of Cumulative Abnormal Returns, Sector’s Daily Share Price Returns can be 
observed. In the horizontal axis a spectrum of 8 days is depicted, where N is the day 
when the Auto Bailout Event took place. 
The Sectors that were analyzed are the ones that seem more tightly connected with the 
Auto Industry: Consumer Discretionary, Energy, Financials, Industrials, Information 
Technology, and Materials. The Daily Share Price Returns of each Sector are an 
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Despite the higher volatility of the Share Price Returns of the Auto Industry, it is clear 














































































Bailout Events, whether a negative or positive share price return is observed. This may 
indicate that in fact there are some Sectors more correlated to the Auto Industry than 
others, when looking to market share valuation. This also indicates that some major 
Events in one Sector may decisively influence the market performance of other different 
Sectors of economic activity. 
5. CONCLUSION 
The Auto Industry has always been one of the cornerstones of the American Economy. 
Unsurprisingly, the downfall of the Big-Three American automakers represented an 
important occurrence. Despite the loss in world market share in the last 30 years, the 
American Industry was on the edge of the crisis a fundamental industry for the 
American Economy.  
In 2007, there were 1 million manufacturing jobs in the auto industry, not accounting 
for the workers of dealerships and suppliers. 16.2 million Motor vehicles were sold in 
the United States in 2007.
10
 In the same year, the Auto Industry represented 3.6% of 
total United States output. This means that, in practical terms, a decrease of 30% in the 
productions of the American Economy would represent a squeeze of 1% on the total 
United States Economy. 
It seemed, in fact, a “Too Big to Fail” Industry for the American Economy. Almost 80 
billion dollars were provided by the American treasury to the three American 
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Given the weight of the Detroit Big-Three automakers on the overall economy, and the 
amount of capital provided by public authorities in the restless period of 2008 and 2009 
to the Auto Industry, it was expectable a reaction coming from other important Sectors 
of the American Economy. To assess if other Sectors of the American Economy react to 
the Bailout of the Auto Industry, an Event Study is performed to look at how Share 
Price Returns of different firms respond to given Auto Bailout Events. Cumulative 
Abnormal Share Price Returns of the different important Sectors are observed in order 
to analyze if some Sectors respond more than others when the Bailout to the Auto 
Industry takes place. 5 different Auto Bailout related Events were selected, and 10 
different economic Sectors, plus the Auto Industry, composed by General Motors and 
Ford. In fact, Bailout Events seem to have a statistically significant impact on several 
Sectors of the American Economy. Particularly, there were significant impacts on the 
following Sectors: Consumer Discretionary, Energy, Financial, and Materials. The 
impacts then differ according to the window that is used for the Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns. Some firms seem to respond more in a short window, such as [-1,1], and less in 
one as [-1,7], which may indicate some overreaction from the investors. On the 
contrary, other Sectors only respond significantly to the Auto Bailout Events in larger 
windows as [-1,3], and mainly, [-1,7], which highlight the possibility of a delay in the 
assimilation of information from the stakeholders of those Sectors. 
Generally, and after some days, the reaction of the major part of the Sectors is positive, 
which indicates that investors in these industries perceived the Bailout of the Auto 
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